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1 Introduction 
1.1 The research problem and why it is interesting 
This paper concerns the intersection between two bodies of law. The first body consists of 
intellectual property laws (“IP” - laws). An intellectual property right (“IPR”) amounts to a 
time limited exclusive right granted in reward of innovative intellectual efforts. 
1
 There are 
several forms of IP, in addition to traditional patents and copyrights. 
2
 
 
The second body is that of competition law. EU competition law protects the process of 
competition, thereby ensuring that the “principle of an open market economy with free 
competition” plays out in practice. 3 
 
A property owner’s right to choose whether and with whom to deal is fundamental, and 
applies in relation IP as it does in relation to tangible property. 
4
 In some circumstances, 
however, art. 102 TFEU establishes an exception from the principle of contractual freedom 
by prohibiting a refusal to deal as an abuse of a dominant position.
5
 The topic up for dis-
cussion in this paper is under what circumstances art. 102 establishes such an exception in 
relation to IP by condemning the exercise of the negative side of an IPR by means of a re-
fusal to license as abusive.  
 
Two recent developments make the EU approach to unilateral refusals to license especially 
interesting for research purposes. Firstly, the CFI issued its Microsoft judgment in 2007.  
6
 
Microsoft is by far the most comprehensive refusal to license case to date, and spurred a 
                                                 
 
1
 Caggiano (2012) p. 9.  
2
 For an overview of different forms of IP, see Whish (2012) p. 767 – 768. 
3
 Caggiano (2012) p. 9, principle in in Art. 119 TFEU. 
4
 Lidgard (2009) p. 695. 
5
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
6
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission (Microsoft). 
 2 
significant deal of debate as it was perceived by many as widening the scope for a finding 
of an abuse.  
 
Secondly, the Commission has for some time been in the process of modernizing its en-
forcement practice to unilateral exclusionary conduct. These efforts led to the publication 
of its Guidance Paper in 2009, two years after Microsoft. 
7
 The modernized approach to 
refusals to license incorporates different conditions than the test applied by the CFI, and 
consequently revitalized the debate.  
 
1.2 The scope for intervention and the need to look into the underlying 
considerations reflected in law 
Competition and IP laws have complementary goals. 
8
  Both bodies of law seek to maxim-
ize consumer welfare and facilitate dynamic efficiencies ultimately benefitting consumers 
by technological progress and improved products. 
9
  
 
IP laws promote innovation by establishing ex-ante incentives. They achieve this by prom-
ising that time limited, exclusive rights will be accorded to the fruits of innovative efforts 
when specific conditions are satisfied. The exclusive right represents a protection against 
imitation, and the innovator’s financial reward is accordingly secured – provided that there 
is a market for the asset.
10
 
 
                                                 
 
7
 “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings”, (2009/C 45/02) (Guidance Paper) 
8
 Drexl (2007) p. 648. 
9
 Whish (2012) 769 – 770 with reference to key EU and US documents. Note that competition law seeks to 
promote other forms of efficiencies as well, see Whish (2012) p. 4 – 6. 
10
 Kwok (2011) p. 262, Drexl (2007) p. 651. 
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Competition law, on the other hand, promotes innovation by protecting rivalry. 
11
 Competi-
tion as a rivalrous process is presumed to facilitate dynamic efficiencies.
12
  
 
It has gradually become accepted that there is no inherent conflict between granting exclu-
sive rights and protecting the process of competition.
13
 Once granted, however, the exercise 
of an IPR is subject to the limits for legitimate commercial behavior established by compe-
tition law. 
14
 These limits are seldom crossed, as competition law accommodates for the 
normal exercise of IPRs. 
15
 As a general proposition, it is only appropriate to invoke com-
pulsory licenses under art. 102 in “exceptional circumstances”.16 
 
In functional terms, such “exceptional circumstances” occur when a refusal to license has 
effects running counter to the economic rationale behind granting the IPR in the first place.  
Rather than inducing, it blocks dynamic competition. 
17
 In theory, it has been observed that 
forced licensing has been invoked in two distinguishable scenarios: 
 
1) The exclusive right is construed too broadly from the outset, i.e. the IP regime is 
poorly designed.   
2) Due to external market failures, a refusal to license produces negative effects that 
could not be foreseen by the lawmakers when the IP- regime was contemplated.
18
 
 
The appropriate scope for ex-post intervention under competition law wherein forced li-
censes are invoked, is an economical question at its core and highly controversial. 
19
 It is 
                                                 
 
11
 Kwok (2011) p. 262, Drexl (2007) p. 648. 
12
 Whish (2012) p. 5. 
13
 Drexl (2007) p. 648, Whish (2012) 769 – 770. 
14
 Anderman in Anderman & Ezrachi (2011) p. 4. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Whish (2012) p. 797. 
17
 Drexl (2007) p. 651. 
18
 Ibid, p. 651 – 652. 
 4 
important to stress, therefore, that the focus of this paper is on law and not economics. Its 
ambit of reach is limited to ascertaining under what circumstances refusals to license might 
be challenged as abuses of dominance under art. 102. This entails identifying and interpret-
ing the legal conditions for such a finding.  
 
That being said, the nature of competition law is such that its application necessarily re-
flects underlying considerations of an economical/policy nature. In a legal analysis, it is 
highly relevant to look into what considerations the law departed from and whether devel-
opments in case law express changes in these underlying views. Establishing such concep-
tual developments might provide indications about where the law is heading.  
 
The following discussion will consequently attempt to shed light on these broader lines in 
addition to interpreting the relevant sources of law in isolation.  A fundamental issue in this 
respect is to what extent EU law reflects the notion that IP has special qualities that justifies 
a different treatment than tangible property in a refusal to supply scenario.  
 
1.3 Delimiting the topic 
Two important issues will not be dealt with in this paper. Firstly, I will not consider the 
threshold for falling within the functional scope of Art. 102 in the first place, namely that 
of a “dominant position”. The reader should be aware, however, that the establishment of a 
dominant position in IP cases poses particular challenges. 
20
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
19
 Compare for example Spulber (2008) and Fox (2009) regarding the effects on dynamic efficiencies of in-
voking forced licensing in Microsoft. 
20
 The two market feature of and implications from “essential facilities” dominance has been pointed out in 
theory, see Hou (2012) p. 2 following and Anderman (2009) p. 88.    
 5 
Secondly, I will not distinguish between different forms of IP or deal with arguments flow-
ing from the IP regimes. 
21
 There is a very limited basis in case law for dealing with these 
issues, and they deserve to be addressed directly.  
 
1.4 Sources and methodology  
The legal basis for condemning refusal to license practices as abuses of a dominant position 
is art. 102 TFEU. That article is set out in general terms, however, and does not specifically 
address refusals to license IP. In fact, it was not until in the late eighties that the ECJ sug-
gested that such practices might be prohibited by art. 102. 
22
 
 
Consequently, the primary source for addressing the topic is case law from the community 
courts. The highest court in the EU was named the "Court of Justice of the European 
Communities" after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It is commonly referred to as 
the ECJ, however, and I will use that term in the following. The ECJ hears appeals from the 
General Court, which was previously called the Court of First Instance. 
23
 It additionally 
gives preliminary rulings on questions of EU law referred to it by courts in member 
states.
24
 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the ECJ develops community law by applying a dynamic 
interpretation. 
25
 The relevant judgments might consequently be perceived as expressions 
of the law at a given time in its development. From a methodological perspective, there-
fore, one major challenge in this paper is to establish the snapshots of the law by means of 
                                                 
 
21
 An example is the relationship between the forced licensing remedy in Microsoft and the EU’s possible 
obligations under the TRIPS agreement. See, inter alia, Subramanian (2013). 
22
 See section 2.1.2. 
23
 TFEU art. 256.  
24
 Art. 267 
25
 For a good analysis, see Itzcovich (2011). 
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interpreting the individual judgments, and subsequently identify when and how the law has 
evolved by comparing the snapshots.  
 
In addition to relevant jurisprudence, the aforementioned Guidance Paper will be consid-
ered. This is not a source of law but of policy. 
26
 It could potentially have bearing on how 
the next refusal to license case is decided, however, and will at the very least affect the 
Commission’s own approach to assessing such practices.  
 
1.5 The road ahead 
Structurally, this paper is divided into five main parts. The first concerns the relationship 
between the law on abusive refusals to license IP and the law on abusive refusals to supply 
tangible property. Using the groundbreaking cases establishing these concepts as the point 
of departure, I will look into relevant jurisprudence with a view to ascertain whether and 
how the law on refusals to license and supply differs.  
 
Having established that a “new product” requirement has consistently been invoked in the 
IP cases, I will move on to the second part of the paper. This provides for an analysis of 
how this requirement has been interpreted in case law. Based on the hypothesis that the IP 
– specific requirement presumably mirrors the courts’ underlying views on the 
IP/competition law intersection and especially the degree to which they consider that IP 
“require special deference” in a refusal to supply scenario, I will discuss whether the inter-
pretations of the “new product” requirement reflect broader changes in these underlying 
views. 
27
  
 
Chapter 4 is purely concerned with substantive law, and amounts to the third part of the 
paper. I will identify the conditions that are not specific to the IP context and interpret these 
                                                 
 
26
 Para 3. 
27
 Expression used by Ritter (2005). 
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in light of available case law. An important question is whether Microsoft relaxed these 
conditions compared with what followed from the relevant judgments of the ECJ. 
 
Subsequently, I will address the Commission’s modernized approach to refusals to license 
practices. I will explain how Microsoft facilitated the reform, before looking into the theo-
retical and practical implications of departing from a “new product” inquiry in favor of a 
generic refusal to supply test focusing on consumer harm.   
 
In the fifth and final part of the paper, I will use the findings made in the previous analyses 
to shed light on the question of what the next “refusal to license” case might look like – 
when viewed through legalistic lenses. I will identify three categories of possible tests and 
identify factors that will practically affect the likelihood for a finding of an abuse. Lastly, I 
will discuss what unarticulated considerations case law might be interpreted as reflecting, 
and provide some thoughts on arguments IP holders may invoke on this basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
2  Refusals to deal and refusals to license 
2.1 The relationship between the legal tests mandating forced dealing of 
tangible property and forced licensing of intellectual property 
2.1.1 The emergence of a doctrine on abusive refusals to supply tangible property 
Commercial Solvents concerned the only producer of a chemical raw material necessary in 
the production of tuberculosis drugs.
 28
 The producer vertically integrated into the down-
stream market for drugs and simultaneously stopped supplying a drug producer already 
active in that market with the raw material.
29
 This refusal was considered abusive, which 
makes Commercial Solvents a groundbreaking case.  
 
Commercial Solvents was decided at a time when the methodology applied in relation to 
single firm conduct did not necessarily reflect the insights of the economic discipline. No 
theory of competitive harm was established to support the finding of an abuse. From a ped-
agogical point of view, therefore, it is beneficial to point out how a refusal such as that put 
under scrutiny might raise competitive concerns.  
 
In economic terms, Commercial Solvents concerned monopoly leveraging achieved 
through vertical foreclosure. The economic argument that could have been articulated 
30
 
would run like this: Commercial Solvents enjoyed a monopoly position on the upstream 
market for the production of a raw material. This raw material amounted to an input which 
was essential for any entity operating on a downstream market for the production of final-
ized drugs. As a consequence of its monopoly position and the lack of viable substitutes for 
the raw material, Commercial Solvents was in a position where it could strategically refuse 
                                                 
 
28
  Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Com-
mission. (Commercial Solvents) 
29
 Ibid, para 23. 
30
 Fatur (2012) p. 177. 
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to supply independent entities with the essential input. Such a move would facilitate the 
extension of Commercial Solvent’s monopoly position to the secondary market as the mar-
ket presence of independent entities depended on continuous supplies. In addition to re-
moving the competitive pressure exerted by firms already active in the downstream market, 
the refusal would send a strong signal to potential entrants:  They could not expect to be 
supplied with the input, and consequently would have to enter the upstream market as well. 
The refusal could in other words have an entry deterrent effect in addition to removing ac-
tual competition.  
 
In legal theory, unilateral refusals to deal is a controversial topic. Representatives of the so-
called Chicago School have generally argued in favor of per se legality while Harvard 
School-scholars traditionally advocates a more nuanced, circumstance - based approach. 
31
 
The example above does not purport to take a stand in this debate, but presents a possible 
rationale that could justify intervention in a Commercial Solvents – type scenario. 
 
As a matter of law, Commercial Solvents made it crystal clear that some unilateral refusals 
to deal to existing customers on a downstream market are regarded as abuses of a dominant 
position.
32
 Unfortunately, the ECJ hesitated to explicitly list the conditions drawing the line 
between a legitimate exercise of private property rights and anticompetitive conduct. The 
question is accordingly whether these conditions may be construed on the basis of a careful 
reading of the judgment. 
 
The ECJ’s focus was on the effects of the refusal on competition in the secondary market. 
It rather categorically stated that dominant undertakings cannot act in such a way as to 
“eliminate their competition”.33 This statement indicates that a refusal resulting merely in a 
weakening of competition would not have been considered abusive. The ECJ was further-
                                                 
 
31
 Hovenkamp (2008) p. 110.  
32
 Whish (2012) p. 699 
33
 Para 26. 
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more satisfied with a “risk” of elimination, thereby justifying intervention on the basis of a 
possibility as opposed to an actual effect. 
34
 
 
The effects of a refusal to deal on competition mirror the degree to which the market pres-
ence of independent entities is dependent on the input they are being denied. 
35
 While not 
explicitly requiring the input to be essential, indispensable or the like, the question is 
whether Commercial Solvents might nevertheless be interpreted as implying some sort of 
“essential input” condition.  
 
The ECJ did in fact look into whether there existed actual or potential substitutes for the 
raw material. This discussion was conducted in conjunction with the dominance assess-
ment. In the ECJ’s view, it was “irrelevant” that there existed a theoretical possibility that 
the requestor might have been able to continue production by adapting its manufacturing 
processes so that the final product could be manufactured on the basis of alternative raw 
materials. 
36
 According to Larrouche, this finding indicates that Commercial Solvents was 
not an essential facilities case as the input was not “indispensable”. 37  
 
Other authors interpret Commercial Solvents as reflecting a condition of indispensability/ 
essentiality, however. Eagles and Longdin identifies the fact that the requested input was 
“crucial” for the market presence of the requestor as one of the “pivotal” factors for the 
finding of an anticompetitive refusal. 
38
 Hou interprets the judgment as requiring that there 
should be “no economically viable substitutes for the input on the primary market”. 39 Ez-
rachi and Maggiolino even argue that Commercial Solvents reflects a stricter condition of 
                                                 
 
34
 Ibid. 
35
Ahlborn (2008) p. 10.   
36
 Para 15. 
37
 Larrouche (2000) p. 168.   
38
 Eagles (2011) p. 159 -60.  
39
 Hou (2012) p. 8, see section 4.3 below about “economic viability” as a controversial concept. 
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indispensability than modern cases.
40
 The ECJ itself has furthermore, as acknowledged by 
Larrouche, interpreted Commercial Solvents as consistent with an indispensability criteri-
on.
41
  
 
A last important observation is that the ECJ confirmed the Commission’s finding that the 
potential substitutes were only at an “experimental stage” or “too vague and uncertain to be 
seriously considered”. 42 The requirement that alternatives must have a degree of realism to 
be considered relevant is consistent with how the “indispensability” condition has been 
interpreted in subsequent case law. 
43
  
 
On this basis, it is submitted that Commercial Solvents established a test under which a 
refusal to continue to supply an input to an entity operating on a downstream market will 
be deemed to be abusive if three circumstances are present. Firstly, the input must be essen-
tial for the productive activities of the requesting entity. Secondly, the refusal must risk 
eliminating all competition in the downstream market as a result of the essentially of the 
input. Lastly, the refusal must not be objectively justified. The Commercial Solvents test 
was subsequently confirmed in Télémarketing.
 44
 
 
While providing clarity in this respect, Commercial Solvents raised two particularly vexing 
questions. Firstly, it was not clear whether a dominant undertaking sometimes has an obli-
gation to supply new entrants to a market in which it is already active with an essential in-
put. Secondly, it was not clear whether and under what circumstances the obligation to 
                                                 
 
40
 Ezrachi & Maggiolino (2012) p. 602 – 603.  
41
 Larrouche (2000) p. 168 in note 206, Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GMBH v Mediaprint and Others 
(Bronner) in para 38.  
42
 Para 13.  
43
 See section 4.11. 
44
 Case C- 311/84 CBEM v CLT and IPB para 25 – 27. 
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supply an essential input could establish an obligation to license where the requested input 
is protected by some form of IPR. 
45
 
 
2.1.2 Accepting that the exercise of IP rights in secondary markets can be 
abusive: The Volvo case as a door opener 
14 years after Commercial Solvents, the ECJ issued its groundbreaking ruling in Volvo.
46
 
This judgment established that refusals to license IP can amount to abuse of dominance, 
and furthermore provides important insights into the relationship between the law on refus-
als to supply and refusals to license.  
 
The factual background to the dispute was that an entity had begun to import body panels 
made for a certain Volvo model into the UK. The design of the panels was registered under 
and protected by UK law. Volvo commenced proceedings before national courts on the 
basis that the panels had been manufactured without the necessary consent. 
 
Two questions arising from the dispute were referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. The 
following discussion relates to the second, which reads as follows: 
 
“Is it prima facie an abuse of such dominant position for such a manufacturer [Volvo] 
to refuse to licence others to supply such body panels, even where they are 
willing to pay a reasonable royalty for all articles sold under the licence [….]?”. 47 
 
The ECJ’s starting point was the recognition that exclusivity is the very core of the protec-
tion provided under IP laws. The negative right to refuse to grant access to the protected 
asset lies at the heart of such exclusivity. To impose an obligation to license would conse-
                                                 
 
45
 Anderman (2011) at 94. 
46
 Case C-238/87 Volvo UK v Veng AB (Volvo)  
47
 Ibid. 
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quently deprive the proprietor of the very “substance of his exclusive right” - even if the 
grant of access was to be conditioned on the return of a reasonable royalty.
48
 Hence, a mere 
refusal to license on reasonable terms cannot amount an abuse in itself. 
49
  
 
The Court went on to clarify, however, that additional circumstances may render a refusal 
to license with an abusive character. If, hypothetically, an undertaking in Volvo’s position 
refuses to provide an independent entity with a license it needs to make spare parts for a 
model which is still in widespread circulation, and that refusal is coupled with a decision 
on the part of the proprietor to cease production of spare parts for that very model, the prac-
tice might amount to an abuse.
50
 
 
Interestingly, this example indicates that refusals to license must have a particular effect, 
which was not a part of the Commercial Solvents test, to qualify as abusive: They must 
deprive consumers of a particular product (spare parts for a specific model) for which con-
sumer demand can be established (the model is still in widespread circulation).  
 
2.1.3 Framing the question on the basis of Commercial Solvents and Volvo 
The discussion of Commercial Solvents and Volvo was intended to serve a twofold purpose. 
Firstly, it provides a basis for discussing whether subsequent case law reflects a consistent 
view on the relationship between the legal tests mandating forced dealing of tangible prop-
erty and forced licensing of intellectual property. It was established that the ECJ, from the 
very outset of the relevant jurisprudence, drew a distinction between tangible and intangi-
ble property which was reflected in the competition law analysis.  
 
                                                 
 
48
 Para 8.  
49
 Coco (2008) p. 13 
50
 Para 9. 
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The second purpose was to establish what action the ECJ took to accommodate for an ap-
propriate consideration of the specific characteristics of IP under a refusal to supply scenar-
io. Volvo reflects a particular concern with whether consumers would be deprived of a spe-
cific product as consequence of the refusal. The hypothetical example constructed by the 
Court indicates that unlike in Commercial Solvents, the risk of elimination of competition 
in the secondary market will not qualify as a sufficient effect to justify intervention. The 
historical starting point of EU jurisprudence was in other words that the threshold for 
forced licensing should be higher than the threshold for forced dealing of physical assets. 
 
The question then, is whether subsequent cases support the interpretation that there are two 
legal tests, one of which is specific to the IP context, governing unilateral refusals to sup-
ply. If that is the case, it needs to be examined how Volvo’s additional IP - specific re-
quirement has been interpreted and specified by the courts.  
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2.2 EU law on refusals to deal operates with at least two competing tests  
2.2.1 Modern case law reflects the positions taken in Volvo and Commercial 
Solvents 
Bronner is the natural starting point for this discussion as it is the only instance at which 
the ECJ has explicitly said something about the relationship between the legal requirements 
for forced access to tangible and intangible property.
51
 The case concerned a refusal to 
grant access to a distribution system for newspapers. IPRs were not involved. 
 
While recalling that it had considered the effect that the refusal in question prevented the 
emergence of a “new product” relevant in Magill52, which was an IP case, the ECJ was 
unwilling to elaborate on whether this circumstance is a requirement for forced access to 
tangible property. It held that: 
 
 “even if that case-law53 on the exercise of an intellectual property right were applicable to 
the exercise of any property right whatever, it would still be necessary […..], not only that 
the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to eliminate all competition 
in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the service and that 
such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also that the service in itself be 
indispensable to carrying on that person's business[…..]. ”54 
 
In short, even if the blocking of a (“new”) product is a requirement in tangible property 
cases, the conditions of i) indispensability, ii) elimination of competition and iii) no objec-
tive justification would still have to be satisfied. The condition of indispensability was not 
                                                 
 
51
 In theory, it has been debated whether there is a separate line of “essential facilities” cases, see Ritter 
(2005) p. 2-6. Ritter (p. 6) and Fatur (2012) p. 185 argue that there is a “single strand of case law” encom-
passing both refusal to grant access and refusal to supply.  
52
 Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P RTE and ITP v Commission (Magill) 
53
 Magill. 
54
 Para 41. 
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met in Bronner as several alternatives to the dominant undertaking’s distribution system 
could be identified.
55
 
 
While it is important to stress how the ECJ refrained from articulating a position on wheth-
er the legal test is the same irrespective of whether the asset to which access is sought is 
protected by IPRs, Bronner does not necessarily contradict the conclusion that modern ju-
risprudence is consistent with the positions taken in Commercial Solvents and Volvo. In 
order to answer that question, I will examine whether the IP cases share a common denom-
inator in that a circumstance echoing the one in Volvo has been present. The question is in 
other words whether the community courts have always found that a product has been 
blocked from the market leaving unsatisfied consumer demand in the cases where a refusal 
to license has been deemed to be abusive. 
 
As acknowledged in Bronner, the ECJ considered the circumstance that the refusal blocked 
a “new product” consumers were in demand of relevant in Magill.56 It did not merely ask 
whether competition in the secondary market would be eliminated following the refusal. 
Such an approach is consistent with the one indicated by Volvo.  
 
IMS
57
 is the second modern case on refusals to license IP. It provided clarity about the rela-
tionship between the “new product” factor identified in Magill and the triplet of circum-
stances
58
 required in physical property – cases. The ECJ considered that the test applied in 
Magill establishes cumulative requirements. Among these is the condition that the refusal 
must prevent the offering of a “new product” for which potential consumer demand can be 
established.
59
 This additional requirement reflects the example in Volvo in that the blocking 
                                                 
 
55
 Para 42, 43 and 44. 
56
 Para 54. 
57
 Case C – 418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health. (IMS) 
58
 See section 2.1.2. 
59
 Para 38. 
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of a product leaves unsatisfied consumer demand. It is refined, however, as the blocked 
product has to be “new”. 
 
Microsoft 
60
 is the most recent IP judgment to date. I will deal with the specific facts of the 
case below. For the purposes of this discussion, the point is that the CFI considered the 
question of whether the refusal amounted to an abuse on the basis of a test which incorpo-
rated an additional “new product” condition. 61 Formally speaking, therefore, Microsoft 
confirms the consistent line from Volvo to modern jurisprudence. 
 
While the pattern of the conditions that have been required in IP cases is one of consisten-
cy, it should be stressed that case law provides an opening for formulating an alternative 
test. According to the ECJ, the Magill/IMS - list of exceptional circumstances are cumula-
tively “sufficient” rather than cumulatively “necessary”.  62 It is consequently not ruled out 
that the ECJ will depart from a test incorporating a condition relating to the blocking of a 
“new” product in future cases, and find exceptional circumstances in other factors. 63  
 
2.2.2 Final remarks and the way forward 
The community courts have required a “triptych” of circumstances to be identified in cases 
concerning refusals to deal/grant access to physical property.
64
 In all the cases where a re-
fusal to supply an input protected by IP has been considered abusive, however, they have 
identified a fourth circumstance. This fourth circumstance relates to the blocking of a novel 
product from the market place, leaving unsatisfied consumer demand.  
 
                                                 
 
60
 Case C – 3/37.792 Microsoft v Commission 
61
 Paras 332, and 643 – 665. 
62
 IMS para 38. 
63
 Østerud (2010) p. 229 - 30. 
64
 Lévêque (2005) at 104. 
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This paper is concerned with how refusals to license are treated under art. 102.  The sub-
stantive content of the “new product” requirement is accordingly of primary interest. The 
relevant cases from the community courts must be interpreted with a view to establish 
when the “new product” condition is satisfied. 
 
It is natural to raise a question of a more conceptual nature as well, however. To the degree 
the judgments provide a basis for it, it should be examined why the law on refusals to li-
cense incorporates a “new product” requirement not found in the cases concerning tangible 
property. As the application of the “new product” condition is limited to the IP context, 
such an analysis can hopefully provide insights into the courts underlying views on how to 
strike the right balance between IP and competition law, and whether these views have 
been consistent or evolved over time.   
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3 The “new product” requirement   
3.1 From the blocking of an identified product to a limitation of technical 
development on the competitor side 
3.1.1 Magill and IMS – a gradual relaxation of the threshold for intervention  
The Magill case arose as a result of individual television stations enjoying copyright pro-
tection over their respective weekly programmes listings under Irish law. 
65
 An independent 
publisher called “Magill” was denied the licenses necessary to accumulate the information 
about each station’s future programmes and use it to produce a television guide containing 
advance information about the programmes running on each of the stations in the week to 
come.
66
  
 
On appeal, the ECJ confirmed the Commission’s and the CFI’s findings of there being no 
actual or potential substitutes for Magill’s blocked guide. 67 A comprehensive weekly tele-
vision guide giving advance information about the programmes of the week (the “new 
product”) was considered to meet a “specific, constant, and regular consumer demand” 
left unsatisfied by the lists of programmes for periods of respectively 24 and 48 hours pub-
lished in the newspapers, and the “highlights of the week” programmes featured in some 
magazines (the old products). The ECJ agreed that “only weekly television guides contain-
ing comprehensive listings for the week ahead would enable users to decide in advance 
which programmes they wished to follow and arrange their leisure activities for the week 
accordingly”. 68 
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As is evident from this extract, the “new product” inquiry took the form of a concrete com-
parative exercise. The ECJ asked whether a specific blocked product was sufficiently dif-
ferentiable from specific products currently offered on the market. When executing this 
comparison, it focused on the functionalities of the preexisting products and the blocked 
product. What was confirmed by the ECJ was that a specific blocked product offered spe-
cific functionalities in addition to those provided by the products already available on the 
market, and that a “specific, constant and regular potential consumer demand” for these 
additional functionalities could be identified. 
69
  
 
Logically, a comparative test presupposes that two parameters are established. The first is 
the threshold for sufficient newness. The question is whether a product is new enough. 
Magill does not provide more guidance on how to define this threshold than what follows 
from a linguistic interpretation of the term “new”, however.  
 
The next parameter is that of guiding principles for distinguishing between relevant and 
irrelevant differences in products. Such guiding principles is a prerequisite for  comparing 
the degree of differentiation between the blocked and the preexisting products in question 
with the baseline represented by the threshold for sufficient newness. While establishing 
that differences in functionalities are relevant, Magill gives little information about what 
differences should be regarded as irrelevant. 
70
 
 
It might be argued that the Magill case simply did not turn on the threshold for sufficient 
newness as the blocked product was clearly “new” from a common sense perspective. In 
IMS, however, the interpretation of the “new product” condition was at the crux of the case. 
In the following, I will discuss to what extent IMS clarifies or modifies the approach adopt-
ed in Magill.  
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The petitioner in IMS, a company called NDC, wanted to enter a market for pharmaceutical 
sales data. IMS Health was dominant in this market, and offered studies of regional sales 
data based on two alternative brick structures. 
71
 Each of the bricks in the structures corre-
sponded to a specific geographic area, and took account of various parameters.
72
 Clients 
quite rapidly adapted their systems to rely on the structures. 
73
 
  
When NDC tried to enter the market, IMS was granted an interlocutory order prohibiting 
NDC from presenting sales data through the brick structure or any alternative structure de-
rived from it. Under national legislation, the brick structure might enjoy copyright protec-
tion. 
74
  
 
As a result of the adaptations made by potential clients, however, the exclusive right con-
ferred by the copyright legislation equated to a form of control over access to a de facto 
industry standard. 
75
 The questions issued by the national court to the ECJ for preliminary 
ruling were based on the proposition that clients would not be interested in sales data pre-
sented through any other formats than the protected brick structure. NDC could only enter 
the relevant market by imitating it, as potential clients would “reject any product which 
does not make use of the databank protected by copyright”.  76 
 
The fact that partial imitation was a prerequisite for potential consumer demand for the 
blocked product made the discussion of the “new product” condition particularly delicate. 
The ECJ was forced to draw the line for sufficient newness. 
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By means of introduction, the Court referred to the opinion of the General Advocate estab-
lishing that forced licensing is appropriate if the “refusal to grant a license prevents the 
development of a secondary market to the detriment of consumers”. 77 A refusal to supply 
an indispensable input protected by IP will consequently be regarded as abusive only pro-
vided that the undertaking requesting the input:  
 
“does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already of-
fered on the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property right, but intends to 
produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is 
a potential consumer demand”. 78 
 
This standard supports a fairly lenient interpretation of the term “new product”. The limita-
tion lies in the word “essentially”, and that formulation indicates that duplication on the 
part of the newcomer is allowed to a certain extent.
79
 The Court did not adjudicate on 
where to draw the line, however.
80
 Effectively, the ECJ answered the question of what 
amounts to sufficient newness by formulating a new question which is not much clearer.  
 
For an undertaking to “limit itself essentially to duplicating” the products already provided 
on the marketplace is presumptively a viable commercial strategy only if it is in a position 
to profitably sell its imitations at lower prices than the originals. One conclusion indicated 
by IMS, therefore, is that the promise of a static efficiency gain on the secondary market 
cannot justify forced licensing. 
81
 This conclusion is hardly surprising given the purpose of 
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IP laws, and is consistent with the interpretation of the Volvo case established in section 
2.1.3 above.  
 
Perhaps what is most important is not what the ECJ said about the substantive content of 
the “new product” criterion, but rather what it rejected. It has been regarded as “crucial” 
that the ECJ did not endorse the stringent test adopted by the Advocate General.
82
  In his 
opinion, A.G. Tizzano argued that the “new product” requirement will be satisfied only 
where the undertaking requesting the input “intends to produce goods or services of a dif-
ferent nature which, although in competition with those of the owner of the right, answer 
specific consumer requirements not satisfied by existing goods or services”.  83 This posi-
tion reflects the concrete and comparative approach in Magill. 
84
  
 
The standard applied by the ECJ does not require products to “be of a different nature” or 
answer “specific consumer requirements” to be regarded as “new”, however. As a result, it 
provides an opening for the interpretation that improvements of existing functionalities 
may amount to “new products”. There appears to be a basis for concluding, therefore, that 
the “new product” criterion was relaxed in IMS compared with the standard applied in 
Magill.
85
  
 
On a last note, it should be stressed that IMS clarified that forced licensing is not limited to 
vertical relationships. IMS and NDC were potential competitors in the same market for 
pharmaceutical sales data, and the protection was granted to the fruits of IMS’ efforts of 
improving its services in that market. Following IMS, therefore, the term “new product” 
encompasses products serving some of the same basic functions as and offered in direct 
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competition with the products of the proprietor of the IP. No new market has to be fore-
closed as a result of the refusal. 
86
 
 
In this respect, IMS answers one of the principal questions raised by Commercial Solvents 
in the refusal to license context.  While establishing that a disruption of an ongoing supply 
of an indispensable input facilitating the extension of a dominant position into a down-
stream market might be abusive, Commercial Solvents left the question of whether a domi-
nant undertaking sometimes has an obligation to supply new entrants to a market in which 
it is already active unanswered. 
87
 Following IMS, it is clear that dominant undertakings 
controlling an indispensable input protected by IPRs sometimes have an obligation to facil-
itate the emergence of products competing directly against their own portfolio.  
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3.1.2 The Microsoft case – how the Commission satisfied the “new product” 
requirement without trying to do so 
The Commission’s decision88 in Microsoft was made after Magill, but prior to IMS. It was 
not until after IMS it became clear that the Magill test operates with cumulative require-
ments. This provided an opening for the Commission to adopt what it referred to as an “en-
tirety of the circumstances” approach in Microsoft. It focused on the totality of the factual 
surroundings of the refusal rather than on whether the checklist of conditions identified in 
Magill was present.
89
 According to the Commission’s interpretation, Magill identified three 
sets of exceptional circumstances. 
90
  
 
Consequently, the Commission never asked whether the “new product” requirement was 
fulfilled. The closest it came was to provide a rather short discussion under the heading 
“Impact on technical development and consumer welfare”. 91 
 
Shortly after the publication of the Commission’s decision, however, the ECJ issued its 
ruling in IMS. The clarification that the Magill case reflected a test with cumulative condi-
tions obviously created a tension between the Commission’s decision and the relevant 
precedents. Effectively, there were only two openings for concluding that the Commission 
had shown to the requisite legal standard that the conditions for compulsory licensing were 
fulfilled. Firstly, the CFI could use the opening provided in case law for formulating and 
applying an alternative test for the first time. The second option would be to show that the 
Commission’s decision actually did fit the Magill/IMS test.  
 
The CFI addressed the apparent discrepancy between the Commission’s approach and the 
most recent ECJ precedent head on. It introduced its discussion relating to the “new prod-
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uct” condition by emphasizing that the “fact that the applicant's conduct prevents the ap-
pearance of a new product on the market falls to be considered under Article 82(b) EC, 
which prohibits abusive practices which consist in limiting production, markets or tech-
nical developments to the prejudice of consumers”.92 
 
The importation of Article 82 (b) into the test for forced licensing effectively meant that the 
CFI did not have to undertake a detailed discussion of the “new product requirement” on 
the basis of established case law. It held that “the circumstance relating to the appearance 
of a new product, as envisaged in Magill and IMS Health […] cannot be the only parame-
ter which determines whether a refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable 
of causing prejudice to consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b) EC”.93 
 
It was on this basis that the CFI was able to approve of the Commission’s approach. A 
limitation of technical development may cause prejudice to consumers within the meaning 
of Article 82 (b), and the Commission had as previously mentioned explicitly sought to 
establish that the refusal had the effect of limiting technical development to the detriment 
of consumers.
94
 Consequently, the CFI held that the Commission had established the cir-
cumstance relating to the appearance of a “new product” in spite of the fact that the Com-
mission had never purported that the “new product” prong of the Magill/IMS test was satis-
fied.
95
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3.1.3 Limiting technical development to the prejudice of consumers – the two 
elements of the new standard  
Following Microsoft, it is clear that refusals to license that have the effect of “limiting […] 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers” satisfy the “new product” prong of 
the only test that has ever formed the basis for a community court’s condemnation of a re-
fusal to license as abusive. 
96
 It is by no means obvious that a limitation of technical devel-
opment in the short term will result in consumer prejudice in the long term, however. In the 
following discussion, therefore, I will distinguish between the element of a relevant limita-
tion of “technical development” and the element of “prejudice of consumers”.  
 
The requirement that the refusal limits “technical development” could be interpreted as a 
question of sufficient differentiation between specific products, in line with the Magill ap-
proach. If this was the correct methodology, the mere absence of cloning would not be re-
garded as a technical development, while the bar should not be sat as high as to require the 
development of an entirely new product market. 
97
  The challenge would be to define where 
to draw the line for sufficiently developmental activities.  
 
In practice, however, Microsoft’s inquiry did not take the form of a concrete comparison of 
specific products. 
98
 The CFI never examined at a detailed level whether future improve-
ments of available software would amount to “new products” or “technical develop-
ments”.99 Rather, the Court approved of the Commission’s highly fact specific analysis of 
what effect the refusal was likely to have on the aggregate developmental activities of Mi-
crosoft’s competitors compared with a scenario where forced licensing was invoked. Such 
a focus on aggregate effects is fundamentally different from asking whether a specific 
product offered by one vendor is “new”.   
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In order to provide for a meaningful analysis of this effect based approach, it is necessary 
to briefly account for the facts of the case and the technologies in play. An important clari-
fication is that what Microsoft refused to supply was not IP per se but “interoperability 
information”. 100 In the Software Directive, interoperability is defined as the “ability to ex-
change information and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged”. 101 A 
recent OECD report provides an alternative formulation, conceptualizing “interoperability” 
as relating to the “interconnection and interaction between elements of software and hard-
ware”. 102  
 
A prerequisite for achieving interoperability between two software components is logical 
access to the so – called interface of the other component. 103 The exclusivity conferred by 
national IP legislation might be used to hinder such access, however. When parts of the 
interface enjoy IP protection, control over the interface specifications effectively equates to 
control over interoperability.
104
 A refusal to license blocks the requestor’s products from 
achieving sufficient interoperability with the proprietor’s components. Microsoft enjoyed 
such indirect control over interoperability with its client PC operating system “Windows”.  
 
The key to understanding why the CFI considered that Microsoft’s exercise of this control 
would “limit technical development” in the secondary market is to look at the case through 
the lenses of the requestors: Why did independent manufacturers of work group server OS 
need sufficient interoperability information from Microsoft in order to develop and distrib-
ute their own products?  
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The Microsoft case concerned two forms of operating systems: Client PC OS and work 
group server OS. These systems interoperate within the networks of computers in modern 
office environments. 
105
 A detailed explanation of the functional roles of the two forms of 
operating systems goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
106
 It suffices to observe that, within 
a network, workgroup servers had to “interoperate with Microsoft’s PC Operating System” 
to “do their job”. 107  
 
Consumers clearly want their work group servers to “do their job”. Due to the ubiquity of 
“Windows”, sufficient interoperability with this was an immensely important criterion 
when consumers decided which work group server OS to buy. They simply would not 
choose a competing work group server OS, regardless of its intrinsic superiority to Mi-
crosoft’s alternative, if it was not sufficiently interoperable with the most recent version of 
“Windows”. As a result, consumer’s purchasing decisions would be channeled towards 
Microsoft’s work group server OS if the interoperability information was not disclosed to 
independent producers. 
108
  
 
This lock in effect was the starting point for the analysis of the effects of the refusal on 
“technical development”.  Competing producers of work group server OS have no incen-
tive to incur the costs required to improve their products if the intrinsic quality of a work 
group server OS is secondary to its capability for interoperating with “Windows” in the 
eyes of consumers.  
 
In the event that the interoperability protocols were disclosed, however, independent pro-
ducers would be put in a position where it could be rational to develop products differing 
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from Microsoft’s alternative in ways consumers appreciate. 109 One fundamental question 
when determining whether the refusal “limited technical development” was accordingly 
whether competing producers of work server group OS, if granted forced access to the in-
teroperability information, were most likely to offer technological improvements or limit 
themselves to imitating Microsoft’s technology.  
 
The CFI held that competing producers were most likely to come up with additional fea-
tures considered important by consumers under a scenario of forced access. 
110
 This stand-
point has been characterized as “crucial”, and could explain how it was able to conclude 
that the circumstance relating to the blocking of a “new product” was present.111 Under this 
interpretation, the term “new product” refers to innovative technologies rather than to a 
specific product. 
112
  Microsoft’s refusal blocked innovative technologies from entering the 
market by removing the incentives of independent producers for developing the technolo-
gies in the first place.  
 
In line with this interpretation, it has been observed that Microsoft effectively used Article 
102 (b) to “import innovation into the Magill equation”. 113 The CFI did not express any 
strict standard on the relevant fruits of innovation, however. The Microsoft inquiry has con-
sequently been dubbed a “new features” as opposed to a “new product” test. 114  
 
The low threshold for relevant technological improvement was furthermore coupled with a 
low standard of proof. It has been pointed out that the CFI found it “sufficient for there to 
be a possibility that a new product or a variation of an existing product might have emerged 
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but for Microsoft’s conduct”. 115  An alternative formulation is that Microsoft’s “new prod-
uct” inquiry is “satisfied with the possible emergence of unspecified products”.  116  
 
The second element of the standard applied in Microsoft requires that the limitation of 
technical development “prejudice” consumers. This concern with effects on consumers has 
been used as support for the conclusion that the decisive parameter under the Microsoft 
version of the “new product” inquiry is whether consumer welfare is reduced.117  
 
In my view, this perspective is not altogether convincing, however. The CFI considered the 
consequences of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate irrelevant for the 
discussion of whether the refusal limited technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers. 
118
 A meaningful attempt at establishing impacts on consumer welfare under a test 
which is concerned with dynamic efficiencies must logically take the potential for this neg-
ative effect of forced licensing into account.  
 
A more fruitful starting point is the recognition that EU law operates with a broad concept 
of consumer prejudice differing somewhat from the notion of direct consumer harm in eco-
nomic theory. 
119
 Microsoft confirms that the legal concept of consumer prejudice captures 
not only the parameters of price and quantity, but also quality, choice and innovation. 
120
 
The essence of the CFI’s finding of consumer prejudice was that future innovative products 
differing from one another and from the OS offered by Microsoft in features considered 
important by consumers were prevented from entering the market due to the refusal.
121
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Importantly, the CFI focused specifically on the effects of the refusal on the market struc-
ture in the secondary market. In the same way as the Commission, it relied on established 
case law
122
 and considered that practices having the effect of impairing an “effective com-
petitive structure” cause an indirect form of consumer prejudice which is relevant under art. 
102 (b).
123
 The refusal to supply interoperability information caused such indirect consum-
er prejudice as Microsoft “impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group 
server operating systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that mar-
ket”.124  
 
Whish characterizes this statement as “bizarre”, and anticipates that the substantial content 
of the “new product” condition will be examined further in future cases. 125 The concern 
with maintaining an “effective competitive” structure has additionally been criticized from 
an economic point of view as being reminiscent of German ordoliberalism and the Harvard 
School’s structure/conduct/performance paradigm. 126 
 
An alternative perspective is that Microsoft reflects the notion that evidence of direct preju-
dice to final consumers does not constitute a condition for the finding of an abuse in EU 
law, as the foreclosure of competitors is presumed to have an adverse impact on consumer 
welfare.
127
 The concern with market structure/foreclosure effects should furthermore not be 
interpreted in isolation, but contextualized against the previous findings of the CFI. It is 
particularly noteworthy that control over interoperability was considered to amount to an 
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“artificial advantage”.128  It might be argued, therefore, that the CFI’s concern with struc-
tural impairments reflects how it considered that they were achieved by recourse to means 
distinguishable from competition on the merits.
129
 It is important to stress, however, that 
such a reservation has no explicit support in the paragraph of the judgment equaling im-
pairments to an effective competitive structure with consumer prejudice, as this is set out in 
general terms. 
130
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3.2 Why a “new product” requirement?  
The aim of the following discussion is to shed light on and, if possible, answer two ques-
tions: 
 
1) What was the original rationale behind incorporating a “new product” condition in 
the compulsory licensing test? 
2) Are the subsequent interpretations in case law consistent with this rationale? 
 
The above analysis of the origin and gradual development of the “new product” inquiry 
form the foundation for answering these questions. The “new product” condition is a crea-
ture of the courts, and the best way to shed light on its purpose is accordingly to look into 
how they have applied it. Systematically, therefore, the discussion of the underlying ra-
tionale behind the “new product” requirement belongs after the analysis of its historical 
application.  
 
The starting point is how the community courts, from the very outset of the relevant juris-
prudence, drew a distinction between tangible and intangible property which was reflected 
in the competition law analysis under a refusal to supply scenario 
131
 In the IP cases, they 
consistently invoked an additional “new” product requirement. 132  
 
The additional character of the “new product” requirement must logically reflect the under-
lying view that intellectual property is qualitatively different from tangible property in such 
a way as to justify a heightened threshold for intervention. This conclusion is supported by 
the ECJ’s endorsement of the Advocate General’s view on the purpose of the “new prod-
uct” criterion in IMS. The ECJ affirmed that the “new product” condition “relates to [….] 
the balancing of the interest in protection of the intellectual property right and the econom-
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ic freedom of its owner against the interest in protection of free competition”. 133 The inter-
est in protecting an intellectual property right is a reflection of the rationale for granting it 
in the first place, while the interest in protecting the economic freedom of the owner of the 
asset is equally present in cases concerning tangible property.   
 
The traditional, formalistic interpretation of the “new product” criterion might be interpret-
ed as an expression of a conservative approach to encroaching upon the exclusive rights 
granted under IP regimes. It has been argued that the Magill/IMS test amounted to a very 
“very low false convictions rule”.134 Anderman has emphasized that the Magill standard 
“gives considerable recognition to the special qualities of IPRs as regulated by their own 
legislation and as promoters of innovation”. 135 The “new product” requirement must logi-
cally have played a fundamental role in providing such “considerable recognition” as the 
other conditions are found in cases concerning refusals to deal tangible property as well. 
 
It appears, therefore, that the “new product” requirement was originally not intended to 
function as an accurate proxy maximizing dynamic competition on a case by case basis.
136
 
Rather, it amounted to a strong barrier against intervention ensuring that the ex - ante 
choice of exclusivity as the preferred means of promoting innovation is respected if not 
obviously flawed.  
 
As established above, however, the meaning of the “new product” condition shifted from 
encompassing a specific product the requestor would develop to a much broader concept of 
technical development in Microsoft. 
137
 All refusals to license are potentially capable of 
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limiting technical development to the detriment of consumers. 
138
 The Microsoft version of 
the “new product” inquiry is accordingly not consistent with the notion that Court’s should 
adopt a deferential approach to claims that refusals to license cause consumer prejudice.  
 
It appears, therefore, that while the purpose of the “new product” inquiry has always been 
to strike the correct balance between IP and competition law, the views on how this is best 
achieved have changed.  What started out as a high barrier against intervention reflecting a 
strong presumption of refusals to license not hampering dynamic competition, became a 
concrete inquiry into incentives for innovation on the secondary market. Conceptually 
speaking, the development from Magill to Microsoft amounts to a move from a categorical, 
formalistic condition to an effect based approach.   
 
The desirability of this development is debatable. It might be argued, however, that the 
traditional “new product” inquiry was inapt for discovering what it was intended to any-
way. According to the ECJ, the inquiry serves the function of determining whether the the 
refusal to license “prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers”.139  
 
From an economic point of view, the relevant question when making this assessment is not 
whether the blocked product is “new”, but whether and to what extent consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for the product improvement in question outweighs the cost of making it.
140
 
The concern with “newness” has no basis in modern microeconomics, which considers 
products merely as a bundle of characteristics. 
141
 On this basis, it has been argued that the 
formalistic interpretation of the “new product” requirement was a “bad proxy” for estab-
lishing the very effect courts are ultimately concerned with in refusal to license cases: the 
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loss incurred by consumers as a result of the improvement not being offered on the mar-
ket.
142
  
 
3.3 Reflections and the road ahead 
The analysis in this chapter has uncovered a gradual development in the interpretation of 
the “new product” criterion in case law.  This development might legitimately be interpret-
ed as reflecting broader changes in the underlying views on how to address the 
IP/competition law intersection.  
 
From a practical perspective, however, it is important to stress that the threshold for a find-
ing of an abuse is a product of all the conditions of the test. The debate sparked by Mi-
crosoft has furthermore not been limited to the “new product” inquiry, but additionally re-
volved around alleged relaxations of the non IP- specific conditions. These conditions must 
consequently be analyzed as well with a view to identify how Microsoft clarified and pos-
sibly departed from established case law.  
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4 The non IP-specific elements of the test  
4.1 The “indispensability” of the asset to which access is sought  
It was established above that even the earliest case law on refusals to supply is consistent 
with an “indispensability” condition.143 Alternative expressions pointing at the same char-
acteristic as the term “indispensable” are “essential facility” or “objectively necessary”.144 
It has been argued that these expressions might be used “interchangeably”145, a standpoint 
which is supported by the Commission’s preference for the term “objectively necessary” in 
its recent Guidance Paper.
146
 The Guidance Paper draws on case law, and the courts have 
preferred to use the term “indispensable” rather than “objectively necessary”.147 
 
The key case on “indispensability” in modern jurisprudence is Bronner. This judgment 
clarified the existence and substantive content of the “indispensability” requirement and 
has formed a basis for subsequent interpretations. 
148
  
 
Bronner established that the determinative question when assessing “indispensability” is 
whether potential or actual substitutes for the requested input can be identified. 
149
 When 
subsequently interpreting Bronner in IMS, the ECJ stressed that the fact that reliance on a 
substitute will amount to a competitive disadvantage is not decisive, as “less advantageous” 
solutions are considered relevant. 
150
 The threshold is clearly higher than mere conven-
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ience, and it falls on the undertaking seeking access to concretely demonstrate that there are 
no alternative solutions. 
151
  
 
A frequently held view is that this interpretation of the “indispensability” criterion was re-
laxed in Microsoft. It has been argued that the CFI “degraded” the indispensability condi-
tion, effectively rewriting it to a condition of an identifiable “competitive disadvantage”152, 
that the legal concept of “indispensability” was widened153, and that the condition was 
“tweaked” as the interoperability information was regarded as “indispensable” to the extent 
that it “was necessary to keep a viable competitor in the market (or to persuade one to en-
ter) and the dominant firm was the only economically feasible source of that infor-
mation”.154  Several other commentators argue along the same lines. 155 
 
Many contributions appear to, either explicitly or implicitly, reflect the position that the 
concept of “economic indispensability” was introduced in Microsoft. 156 This concept refers 
to how the CFI considered that while access to the market might have been technically pos-
sible to achieve, the interoperability information was nevertheless “indispensable” as a con-
tinued refusal would eliminate the “economic viability” in competing. 157  
 
What is important to remember, however, is that the ECJ expressly recognized that the cost 
of duplicating the facility could amount to such a substantial economic obstacle that dupli-
cation would not be regarded as a “realistic potential alternative” already in Bronner. 158 
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Economically speaking, it is irrelevant whether the economic “realism” in an alternative 
solution is obstructed by very high costs or by a dramatic reduction of sales. The result on 
the bottom line is the same when income is reduced as when additional costs are incurred. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the view that competing in the secondary market would not 
be “economically viable” under a scenario of continued refusal in Microsoft (interoperabil-
ity is an economically indispensable sales argument) is consistent with the qualification 
that substitutes have to have a degree of realism to be considered relevant in Bronner (ac-
cess is economically indispensable when duplication costs are unrealistically high).  
 
As the basis for concluding that the legal concept of “economic indispensability” amounted 
to a novelty not observed in established jurisprudence, several commentators rely on an 
article by former CFI president Bo Vestdorf .
159
 That article does not take the part of the 
Bronner judgment discussed in the previous paragraph into account, however. 
160
 In fact, 
this part of Bronner is not explicitly addressed in any of the contributions cited above argu-
ing that Microsoft modified the “indispensability” condition.  
 
Banasevic and Hellstrøm provides for a highly insightful analysis of the application of the 
“indispensability” condition in Microsoft. 161 In their opinion, the discussion of the “indis-
pensability” of the requested interoperability information rests on the concept of “competi-
tion on the merits” in EU competition law. 162 As the reader will recall, one of the key find-
ings confirmed by the CFI was that the intrinsic qualities of a work group server OS were 
irrelevant for consumers absent sufficient interoperability with Microsoft’s most recent 
client PC OS. 
163
 As a result, there would be no available scope for “competition on the 
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merits on the basis of the core functionalities” of the work group server OS offered by Mi-
crosoft and independent vendors under the scenario of continued refusal. 
164
  
 
This “objectively necessary to compete on the merits in the secondary market” - perspec-
tive is consistent with the logic applied in Bronner when indicating under what circum-
stances unrealistically high duplication costs might satisfy the “indispensability” condition. 
The ECJ considered that if the economic realism in duplicating the distribution system was 
obstructed by the fact that the requestor had a comparatively much smaller circulation than 
the proprietor, access would not be regarded as “indispensable”. If duplication would have 
represented an unrealistic cost even for a hypothetical undertaking with a circulation com-
parable to that distributed under the existing scheme, on the other hand, forced access 
might be justified.
165
 The underlying rationale must have been that the potential elimination 
of competition would stem from the vulnerability of the competitor seeking access under 
the first scenario, while competition on the merits from an equally efficient entity might be 
eliminated under the second.   
 
Microsoft could furthermore be interpreted as a highly fact specific reflection of how the 
“indispensability” condition is logically interlinked with the “elimination of competition” 
requirement. 
166
 What the CFI confirmed was that the nature of the interoperability infor-
mation was such that a strategic refusal to supply it could create a “substantial threat” that 
the work group server OS market would be monopolized by Microsoft. 
167
 By preventing 
the company from using its control over the interoperability information as a bottleneck, 
                                                 
 
164
 Banasevic (2010) p. 54.  
165
 Bronner paras 45 - 46. 
166
 Ahlborn (2008) p. 10 emphasizes how the approach under the “elimination of competition” prong effec-
tively softened the indispensability standard which is its “flip side”.  
167
 Bohannan (2012) p. 316. 
 42 
the Court sought to protect future competition on the merits in a secondary market which 
was in fact competitive prior to the refusal.
168
  
 
Interestingly, this rationale is reminiscent of the one applied already in Commercial Sol-
vents. While it might have been technically possible to come up with an alternative to 
forced access in that case, the options were so theoretical and disadvantageous that a con-
tinued refusal would create a serious “risk” of monopolization of the secondary market. 169  
 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it is submitted that Microsoft neither tweaked nor 
softened the “indispensability” criterion. The discussion of the “indispensability” of the 
interoperability information should quite to the contrary be characterized as consistent with 
the landmark cases of Commercial Solvents and Bronner, but naturally turned on the spe-
cific facts of the case. 
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4.2 The effect of eliminating competition in the secondary market 
Two main questions must be examined in an analysis of this prong of the forced deal-
ing/forced licensing test. Firstly, it needs to be established whether competition actually has 
to be eliminated to justify intervention, or if a risk of such an effect occurring in the future 
is sufficient. Secondly, the required degree of elimination needs to be established. Does the 
refusal have to eliminate all competition in the secondary market for forced licens-
ing/dealing to be justified, or is it sufficient that competitors are marginalized to a certain 
extent?  
 
Both of these questions were explicitly addressed in Microsoft. Microsoft asserted that it 
had to be demonstrated that the refusal was “likely to limit all competition”, and that the 
standard of proof was something “close to certainty”. 170 While acknowledging that Com-
mercial Solvents was satisfied with a “risk” of elimination, Microsoft argued that that case 
was irrelevant as it did not involve a refusal to license IP. 
171
 The company did in other 
words take the position that a higher threshold for intervention in IP cases should be ac-
commodated not only by the additional “new product” requirement, but also by a stricter, 
IP specific interpretation of the elimination of competition prong.  
 
The CFI was not convinced, however, and regarded Microsoft’s arguments as purely ter-
minological and “wholly irrelevant”. 172 Implicitly rejecting an IP specific interpretation, it 
held that: “the expressions ‘risk of elimination of competition’ and ‘likely to eliminate 
competition’ are used without distinction by the Community judicature to reflect the same 
idea, namely that Article 82 EC does not apply only from time to time when there is no 
more, or practically no more, competition on the market”. 173 The standard advocated by 
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Microsoft would effectively prevent the Commission from achieving the very purpose of 
Article 82 through intervention, “which is to maintain undistorted competition […]”. 174  
 
The CFI’s concern with a possibility for a future effect has been contrasted against the ECJ 
precedents. 
175
 In the Magill case, for example, the refusal would have resulted in an im-
mediate elimination of competition in the market for comprehensive weekly television 
guides as that market would be wholly foreclosed if no licenses were granted. 
176
 Linguisti-
cally speaking, there is furthermore an undisputable difference between a possibility for an 
effect (“risk”) and the probability for the effect actually occurring in practice (“likeli-
hood”). 177 The CFI seemingly did not consider that distinction relevant, however.  
 
In relation to the required degree of potential elimination, the CFI considered that the 
Commission was not required to show that “all” competition would be eliminated. It was 
sufficient that the refusal jeopardized “effective competition”. 178 The concept of “effective 
competition” was subsequently incorporated in the Commission’s 2009 Guidance. 179  
 
Several commentators have subsequently criticized the standard of “risk of elimination of 
effective competition”, considering it to amount to an unwarranted lowering of the thresh-
old for intervention. 
180
 The concept of “effective competition” has additionally been sub-
ject to specific criticism, as it is difficult to establish when competition in a given market is 
“effective”. 181  
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Importantly, Microsoft did not merely clarify the standard, but provides valuable guidance 
about factors that will be affect the likelihood for it being met as well.  
 
Firstly, the CFI confirmed the relevance of Microsoft’s already high market share on the 
market it sought to monopolize as this was characterized by certain loyalty inducing fea-
tures which made consumer switching from Microsoft’s product unlikely to be observed 
for those organizations that had already opted for this solution. 
182
  The practical relevance 
of the proprietor’s market share on the secondary market in refusal to supply scenarios is 
corroborated by the Guidance Paper which identifies it as being indicative of the risk for 
elimination of effective competition. 
183
 It is important to stress how the Commission quali-
fies this point of view, however, by referring to dynamics such as capacity constraints ex-
plaining why such a correlation is likely to be observed.
184
  
 
In relation to high tech markets in particular, an important observation is how the CFI ar-
gued that the presence of strong network effects in the secondary market made it pertinent 
to intervene before the risk of elimination of competition had materialized, as such degra-
dation would be difficult to reverse.  This might reflect the view that intervention is justi-
fied at an earlier stage in markets characterized by strong network effects. 
 
Lastly, Microsoft did, in the same way as Commercial Solvents, concern a disruption of 
previous levels of supply coinciding with the proprietor’s entry into the downstream mar-
ket. 
185
 In Commercial Solvents, the CJ did as previously mentioned hold that dominant 
undertakings cannot act in such a way as to “eliminate their competition”.186 It is indeed 
possible to argue that the circumstance of disruption of historical levels of supply coupled 
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with vertical integration is legally relevant, and that such practices will be considered abu-
sive unless objectively justified.
187
 The Guidance Paper does not go that far, but indicates 
that an interruption of existing levels of supply is more likely to be found abusive than first 
time refusals.
188
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4.3 No objective justification for the refusal 
The concept of objective justifications/necessities has been expressed in a number of judg-
ments and decisions under art. 102. 
189
 This concept entails that conduct which has been 
identified as a prima facie art. 102 infringement will not be characterized as abusive if the 
dominant undertaking concretely demonstrates that it was objectively justified/necessary 
and proportionate. 
190
 The concept of objective justifications does in other words serve the 
function of a defense. 
 
For the purposes of the following discussion, it is clarifying to distinguish between three 
categories of such defenses. 
191
 The first category consists of external circumstances which 
may arise in relation to many different forms of potentially abusive conduct. This category 
encompasses “objective necessities”, such as health or safety considerations, and economic 
justifications, such as the customer being a bad debtor, representing a credit risk or failing 
to fulfill its contractual obligations.
192
  
 
The second category is narrower, and refers to negative effects that might typically be ob-
served when access is sought to so – called “essential facilities”.  This term is used by 
many commentators to describe facilities such as ports, electricity grids or pipelines. These 
physical facilities are characterized by a definite capacity limit, and forced access may con-
sequently result in congestion effects. 
193
  
 
The third category resembles the efficiency defense under Article 81 (3). The logic is that 
conduct which has negative effects on competition should not be prohibited if these con-
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cerns are offset by efficiencies benefitting consumers to the point where they are not 
harmed on balance.  
 
An in-depth discussion of the concept of objective justifications goes beyond the scope of 
this paper. As an introductory matter, it should be pointed out that category 1 and 2 defens-
es may arise within the context of a refusal to license IP. In Microsoft, for example, the 
control over the IP amounted to an indirect form of control over interoperability. An in-
creased number of interoperable products could potentially make the system in question 
more vulnerable to attacks representing a security issue, or cause capacity problems imped-
ing its functionalities. 
194
  
 
What this paper is particularly concerned with, however, is the intersection between com-
petition and IP law. At the very core of this complex field lies the objective of facilitating 
dynamic competition to the benefit of consumers. The efficiency defense will accordingly 
be the focus of the following discussion. 
 
The community courts have gradually accepted that an efficiency defense is available un-
der art. 102, in spite of the fact that the defense in art. 101 (3) is not mirrored in the word-
ing of this article. 
195
 Microsoft forms a part of, but not the last word in this development.  
Two more recent judgments have explicitly dealt with the efficiency defense, namely the 
TeliaSonera and the Post Danmark cases. 
196
 
 
Both of these cases dealt with the effects of pricing practices. TeliaSonera concerned a 
margin squeeze resulting from the prices charged by TeliaSonera for respectively the input 
services necessary for the activities of independent entities offering broadband services to 
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end users, and for its own competing broadband services offered to the very same group of 
end – users. 197 Post Danmark concerned targeted, loyalty inducing pricing policies on the 
Danish market for the distribution of unaddressed mail.
198
  
 
TeliaSonera is an important case as the court expressly recognized that unilateral pricing 
practices having exclusionary effects “may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by ad-
vantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer”. 199 Post Danmark provid-
ed further clarity in that the ECJ identified the conditions that have to be satisfied for this 
defense to apply.  The conclusion remains, however, that Microsoft is the only refusal to 
license case in which claims that the refusal is justified on efficiency grounds has formed a 
central part of the litigation.  
 
Systematically, the following discussion will be limited to Microsoft. I will deal with the 
issue of whether the efficiency claims likely to be raised in the refusal to license context are 
capable of satisfying a Post Danmark – style test in chapter 5. This separation is logical as 
the Post Danmark test is virtually identical with the efficiency defense in the Commission’s 
Guidance Paper. This defense forms an integral part of the Commission’s modernized ap-
proach to refusals to supply, and consequently has to be addressed in conjunction with the 
discussion of this framework anyway.  
 
Two findings made above provide the starting point for an analysis of the efficiency de-
fense in the refusal to license context. Firstly, it was established that the CFI considered the 
negative impact of compulsory licensing on the IP holder’s incentives for innovation irrel-
evant for the discussion under the modified “new product” inquiry.200 Secondly, it was ar-
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gued that Microsoft lowered the threshold for a prima facie finding of an abuse compared 
to the Magill/IMS doctrine, which amounted to a very low false convictions rule.
201
  
 
In sum, these factors have made the question of the practicality of the efficiency defense 
more pertinent. The topic of the following discussion is what can be inferred from Mi-
crosoft about the scope available to IP holders for arguing that respecting the refusal will 
benefit consumers by facilitating greater dynamic efficiencies than forced licensing.  
 
The underlying purpose of the Commission’s intervention in Microsoft was to facilitate 
future innovation in the secondary market to the benefit of consumers. This was reflected 
directly in its approach to ascertaining whether the refusal was abusive. Departing from the 
traditional “exceptional circumstances” test in favor of an “entirety of the circumstances” 
approach, it weighed the effects of respectively forced dealing and continued refusal 
against each other.
202
  
 
In the first part of this balancing exercise, it established that the refusal would discourage 
independent vendors from developing improved products. 
203
 This part of the decision was 
confirmed by the CFI under its modified “new product” inquiry. 204 The Commission’s 
approach differs from the one applied by the CFI, however, in that it found it necessary to 
establish the negative effects of compulsory licensing on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate 
when determining whether the refusal was objectively justified. 
205
 These incentives were 
weighed concretely against the negative effects on technical development from the compet-
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itor side that would occur under a scenario of continued refusal. 
206
 This balancing act 
amounted to a novelty not previously seen in EU jurisprudence. 
207
 
 
The Commission’s approach was quickly dubbed the “incentive balancing” test.208 That 
term is informative as it points at the core of the Commission’s rationale: Compulsory li-
censing is appropriate if it is established that the negative effects of such intervention on 
the IP holder’s incentives for innovation are outweighed by the positive effects on aggre-
gate incentives for innovation in the whole market. 
209
 An alternative perspective is that the 
former “new product” and “no objective justification” conditions were functionally merged 
into a consumer harm requirement conceived as a balancing of effects. 
210
   
 
The CFI was unwilling to admit that the Commission had reached its conclusion on the 
basis of a concrete balancing act, however. It considered that:   
 
“The Commission came to a negative conclusion but not by balancing the negative impact 
which the imposition of a requirement to supply the information at issue might have on 
Microsoft's incentives to innovate against the positive impact of that obligation on innova-
tion in the industry as a whole, but after refuting Microsoft's arguments relating to the fear 
that its products might be cloned”. 211 
 
This statement is unclear about the scope available to dominant undertakings for arguing 
that compulsory licensing will reduce incentives for innovation under the “objective justifi-
cation” prong. On the one hand, the CFI rejected that the Commission had in fact reached 
                                                 
 
206
 Ibid. 
207
 Lidgard (2008) p. 212.  
208
 Koch (2008) p. 29. 
209
 Ibid. 
210
 Denozza (2012) p. 271 
211
 Microsoft para 710. 
 52 
its conclusion on the basis of an ad – hoc balancing of incentives for innovation. On the 
other hand, it did not say that such an approach would have been wrong either.
212
  The CFI 
was careful not to completely close the door for future application of the incentive balanc-
ing test. 
213
  
 
Subsequently, the CFI refuted three main categories of justifications. Firstly, Microsoft 
argued that the IP protection of the requested information amounted to an objective justifi-
cation in itself. That argument was swiftly rejected. It was considered to be “inconsistent 
with the raison d'être” of the exceptional circumstances doctrine, insomuch as the recogni-
tion of the mere holding of an IPR as an objective justification would mean that “the ex-
ception established by the case law could never apply”. 214  
 
Secondly, Microsoft claimed that its incentives for innovation would be reduced if compul-
sory licenses were granted. The CFI considered these assertions to be “vague and theoreti-
cal”, however, as they were not backed up by hard evidence. 215 Interestingly, it regarded 
the fact that Microsoft had historically supplied independent vendors with interoperability 
information as an indication that its incentives for innovation would not be significantly 
hampered under the scenario of forced licensing.
216
 This indicates that the scope for argu-
ing that a disruption of historical levels of supplies was necessary to maintain incentives for 
innovation is narrower than the scope for relying on this argument in relation to a de novo 
refusal.  
 
Microsoft’s concerns relating to possible cloning of its products were lastly considered to 
be unfounded. As support for this conclusion, the CFI referred to its “crucial” finding of 
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competitors being most likely to offer products differing from one another in ways con-
sumers appreciate under the scenario of forced access. 
217
  
 
The general impression is nevertheless that Microsoft provides little or no guidance as to 
what arguments the IP holder must bring forward to justify the refusal on the ground that 
that it maintains ex-ante incentives for innovation. 
218
 While establishing that IPRs cannot 
amount to an objective justification per se, the discussion under the objective justification 
prong has rightly been characterized as “underdeveloped” and in need of further clarifica-
tion. 
219
 It has been observed that the law on refusals to license is “missing” a particular 
objective justification: The IP holder should be provided with an ample scope for invoking 
an objective justification - defense where it can show that “substantial and risky invest-
ments lie beneath the challenged IP rights”. 220 An interesting question is accordingly 
whether the Commission envisages a realistic opportunity to present such claims under its 
modernized approach to refusals to supply. 
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5 The Commission’s proposed generic refusal to supply test 
 
Refusals to license IP have consistently been treated differently than refusals to sup-
ply/grant access to physical property by the community courts. A “new product” condition 
heightening the threshold for intervention has been invoked in the IP cases.
221
  
 
When viewed against this background, the approach advocated in the Commission’s 2009 
Guidance Paper stands out as fairly radical. By establishing a generic test applicable to all 
refusals to supply/grant access irrespective of whether the asset to which access is sought is 
protected by IP, the Guidance Paper simply rejects the relevance of the “new product” con-
dition altogether. In this chapter, I will account for the Commission’s framework. I will 
begin with establishing how Microsoft played a key role in facilitating the reformed ap-
proach before discussing its implications.  
 
5.1 Microsoft as a door opener for the Commission’s reform  
Microsoft’s role in breaking the ground for the Commission’s reform is best understood by 
adopting a somewhat theoretical perspective. The starting point is how the law on exclu-
sionary abuses has traditionally been concerned with market structure and dynamics, ask-
ing whether the “practice interferes with and degrades the market mechanism”.222  The very 
role of the “new product” condition has been to require more than such indirect and poten-
tial consumer harm in refusal to license cases, however. Exclusion to the point that compe-
tition in the secondary market was eliminated did not suffice, and the law on refusals to 
license effectively prescribed a hybrid form of abuse requiring both foreclosure and a direct 
effect on consumers. 
223
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By importing art. 102 (b) into the “new product” condition, Microsoft made case law ac-
cepting impairments to an effective competitive structure as an indirect form of consumer 
prejudice relevant under this prong. 
224
 The “new product” inquiry became concerned with 
exclusionary effects. As a result, the hybrid character of the refusal to license abuse was 
blurred, and the law on refusals to license moved closer to the law on traditional refusals to 
supply.  
 
This development paved the way for the Commission’s modernized approach. At this 
stage, it is important to stress two factors: 1) There is an opening for applying an alternative 
test as the circumstances established in IMS, Magill and Microsoft are cumulatively suffi-
cient rather than necessary
225
, and 2) The CFI was careful not to explicitly disapprove of 
the incentives balance test in Microsoft.
226
  
 
The application of an alternative standard, possibly resembling the incentives balance test, 
would in other words not be in breach of established jurisprudence. As a result, the door 
was open for the Commission to use the “lack of a bright line between the “new product” 
and “elimination of effective competition” criterion in Microsoft to “play down the 
IP/Antitrust issue as a special case and bring it more into line with the standard Article 102 
TFEU jurisprudence”. 227 
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5.2 What are the implications of the Commission’s proposed test? 
The Commission’s generic approach warrants intervention when the refusal:  
 
1) relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete ef-
fectively on a downstream market,  
2) is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream mar-
ket; and  
3) is likely to lead to consumer harm.228  
 
The novel condition is that of likely “consumer harm”. To provide an in depth analysis of 
this complex requirement goes beyond the scope of this paper. The challenge is to identify 
the implications of applying it to refusals to license practices.  
 
The Guidance Paper explains in a straightforward fashion that the Commission will estab-
lish the impacts on consumer welfare on the basis of a balancing test. The question is 
whether “the likely negative consequences of the refusal to supply in the relevant market 
outweigh over time the negative consequences of imposing an obligation to supply”. 229 On 
the face of it, this approach is reminiscent of the incentives balance test applied in Mi-
crosoft.
230
 
 
When providing examples of scenarios where the balancing test might result in a finding of 
consumer harm, however, the Commission limits itself to reiterate effects deemed to satisfy 
the “new product”  requirement in case law. 231As a result, the examples do little more than 
implying the obvious: The Commissions considers that its new approach is not directly in 
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breach of established jurisprudence as the consumer harm requirement will evidently be 
satisfied in scenarios previously deemed to be abusive.  
 
The Commission’s first example is a Microsoft – type scenario. It considers that consumer 
harm may arise where “the competitors that the dominant undertaking forecloses are, as a 
result of the refusal, prevented from bringing innovative goods or services to market and/or 
where follow-on innovation is likely to be stifled”.232 Relying on the IMS formulation of 
the standard, it goes on to explain that “this may be particularly the case if the undertaking 
which requests supply does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or 
services already offered by the dominant undertaking on the downstream market, but in-
tends to produce new or improved goods or services for which there is a potential consumer 
demand or is likely to contribute to technical development”.233 
 
It is important to stress how these examples focus exclusively on the negative effects of the 
refusal on the competitor side of the market. No mentioning is made of the negative impact 
of an order to supply on the IP holder’s incentives. This fits poorly with the balancing test 
which, if taken literally, presupposes that the negative impact of an order to supply is estab-
lished for a finding of an abuse. Exclusion having the effect of blocking innovative prod-
ucts offered by competing producers from the market, for example, would only be consid-
ered abusive if it is demonstrated this “likely negative consequences of the refusal to sup-
ply in the relevant market outweigh over time the negative consequences of imposing an 
obligation to supply”. 234 
 
In my opinion, this inconsistency most likely reflects two findings made in Microsoft. First-
ly, the CFI insisted that the effects of compulsory licensing on Microsoft’s incentives for 
innovation were irrelevant for a prima finding of an abuse, and could only be ascertained 
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under the objective justification prong. 
235
 Secondly, it accepted impairments to an effec-
tive competitive structure as an indirect form of consumer prejudice.
236
 A literal interpreta-
tion of the proposed balancing test requiring a concrete demonstration of the negative ef-
fects of an order to supply for a prima facie finding of an abuse is clearly not easily recon-
ciled with these findings.   
 
Interestingly, the ambivalence between the concern with foreclosure effects and an addi-
tional concept of demonstrable consumer harm is a recurring theme in the Guidance Pa-
per.
237
 The Commission’s starting point is structural, as it will “normally intervene”238 
where it succeeds in establishing that the conduct will lead to “anticompetitive foreclo-
sure”.239 This concern with structural changes has been criticized as “simplified”240 , but is 
consistent with established jurisprudence.
241
 
 
Under the modernized efficiency defense, however, the focus is on net consumer harm. The 
conduct might not be prohibited after all if the dominant undertaking succeeds in establish-
ing that the conduct “leading to foreclosure of competitors” is likely to produce sufficient 
efficiencies “to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely to arise”242. On this basis, 
it has been argued that the focus on “anticompetitive foreclosure” under the modernized 
approach should not be misread as an indication that impairments to the market structure 
are considered harmful per se, as the concept of an effective competitive structure is merely 
used as a proxy for promoting consumer welfare. 
243
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This observation provides for a natural transition to a next important issue. It was estab-
lished above that the concept of “objective justifications” is underdeveloped in the refusal 
to license context. 
244
 A key question is accordingly to what extent the Commission’s mod-
ernized approach provides IP holders with a realistic opportunity for justifying a refusal on 
grounds such as that it maintains incentives for investing in R & D as the challenged right 
protects the fruits of substantial and risky investments.  
245
  
 
On the face of it, the Guidance Paper appears to establish a practical framework for taking 
such arguments into account. The section dealing with refusals to supply clarifies that the 
Commission, when establishing consumer harm, will consider claims by the dominant un-
dertaking that: 1) “a refusal to supply is necessary to allow […] an adequate return on the 
investments required to develop its input business, thus generating incentives to continue to 
invest in the future”, and 2) “its own innovation will be negatively affected by the obliga-
tion to supply, or by the structural changes in the market conditions that imposing such an 
obligation will bring about”. 246  
 
A crucial qualification of the relevance of such claims is made in the following paragraph, 
however.  The initial burden of proof is placed upon the IP holder, who must establish that 
“the conditions set out in Section III D are fulfilled” for the claims to be considered.247 The 
question, then, is what conditions follow from “Section III D”? 
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Section III D is the general part of the Guidance Paper dealing with objective justifications. 
It stipulates that a four pronged cumulative test must be satisfied for the efficiency defence 
to apply: 
248
 
 
1) “The efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct”.  
2) “The conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies”.  
3) “The likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets”; and 
4) “The conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most ex-
isting sources of actual or potential competition”. 
 
The ECJ’s formulation of the efficiency defense in Post Danmark slightly relaxes the “in-
dispensability” condition, but is otherwise virtually identical with this test. The judgment 
furthermore confirms that the burden for proving that all the conditions of the defense are 
fulfilled vests with the dominant undertaking. 
249
 It must demonstrate that: 
 
1) The identified efficiency gains “have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a 
result of” the conduct put under scrutiny.   
2) “Such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in efficiency”. 
3) “The efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counter-
act any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected 
markets”; and 
4) That the conduct “does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most 
existing sources of actual or potential competition”. 250 
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For the purposes of this discussion it is not important whether the efficiency defense which 
is now law, namely the one following from Post Danmark, is completely identical with the 
version advocated by the Commission in its Guidance Paper. The important question is 
whether a test in line with the one advocated by the Commission and confirmed in essen-
tially the same form by the ECJ is conceptually adequate for evaluating the claims relating 
to negative effects on incentives for innovation that are recognized in the refusals to supply 
- section of the Guidance Paper, i.e. claims that 1) “a refusal to supply is necessary to allow 
[…] an adequate return on the investments required to develop its input business, thus gen-
erating incentives to continue to invest in the future”, and 2) “its own innovation will be 
negatively affected by the obligation to supply, or by the structural changes in the market 
conditions that imposing such an obligation will bring about”. 251 
 
The starting point for a successful efficiency defense is identifiable, specific efficiencies 
arising as a result of a particular course of conduct. 
252
 The adequacy of such a mechanical 
conduct – effect perspective is questionable, however, when the refusal is alleged to main-
tain proper incentives for innovation possibly benefitting consumers by unspecified novel 
products. Such claims are inherently abstract. It has convincingly been pointed out that 
maintaining incentives for future innovation should not be perceived as an efficiency gain 
flowing directly from a particular course of conduct, but as a question of long – term ef-
fects to be taken into account as a component in a broad analysis. 
253
 The Commission’s 
approach in Microsoft arguably reflected this view as it conducted a concrete and broad 
balancing of effects. 
254
 
 
The issues arising from applying a mechanical conduct-effect approach in the IP context 
become even more evident when the balancing standard is taken into consideration. This 
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prong of the test requires the IP holder to demonstrate that the likely efficiencies brought 
about by the refusal outweigh/counteract “any likely negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare in the affected markets”. 255 It is difficult to see what evidence the IP 
holder can produce that is capable of satisfying this prong. Predictions that compulsory 
licenses will weaken incentives for innovation have a theoretical nature, and as such “can-
not be subject to rigorous to empirical proof”. 256 
 
A last issue arises from the additional concern with exclusionary effects within the effi-
ciency defence itself. The final prong of the test requires the dominant undertaking to 
demonstrate that the refusal “does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or 
most existing sources of actual or potential competition”.257 This requirement reflects the 
underlying position that “rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of economic 
efficiency, including dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation”, as “the dominant 
undertaking will lack adequate incentives to continue to create and pass on efficiency 
gains” in the absence of competitive pressure.258  
 
It is not clear how a requirement of no “elimination of competition” can be satisfied in a 
refusal to supply scenario, however. 
259
 For the consumer harm requirement and thereby the 
efficiency defense to come into play, the Commission must already have established that 
the refusal is “likely to eliminate effective competition” in the secondary market. It could 
be the that the term “likely elimination of effective competition” understood as the lower 
threshold for relevant foreclosure
260
 has a different meaning than the requirement that the 
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refusal “does not eliminate effective competition” for asserted efficiencies to be taken into 
account, but how and to what extent the standards differ remains an open question. 
 
On last note, it should be pointed out that the Commission considers the room for relying 
on prospective efficiencies to be very limited within a scenario where a super – dominant 
undertaking’s exercise of an exclusive right has the effect of entrenching, creating or ex-
tending its market position.  The Commission’s position is crystal clear in this respect: “ex-
clusionary conduct which maintains, creates or strengthens a market position approaching 
that of a monopoly can normally not be justified on the grounds that it also creates efficien-
cy gains”.261 It appears, therefore, that sufficient foreclosure will practically equate to a 
finding of consumer harm in a situation such as that put under scrutiny in Microsoft where 
a super – dominant undertaking leverages its market power into an adjacent market by 
means of a refusal to license.  
 
In sum, the analysis undertaken above indicates that the implications of the Commission’s 
modernized approach to refusal to license practices are ambiguous. From a theoretical point 
of view, the generic character of the test implies that the Commission has rejected the no-
tion that IP “require special deference compared to tangible property” in a refusal to supply 
scenario.
262
 This rejection is consistent with the standpoint taken in a number of recent aca-
demic contributions. It has been observed that that there is “no clear basis” in economics 
for applying an IP specific test heightening the threshold for intervention simply because of 
the nature of IP rights. 
263
 The crucial question is the same in refusal to deal and refusal to 
license cases, namely what effects forced access will have on future incentives for invest-
ment. 
264
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It is not clear, however, what practical implications the generic test will have compared 
with the Microsoft formula for intervention. This uncertainty is a result of two factors in 
particular: 1) The exemplified scenarios of IP refusals capable of resulting in consumer 
harm merely reiterates the findings made under the “new product” inquiry, and 2) While 
initially accepting arguments relating to the protection of future incentives for investment 
and innovation as relevant, these claims will be extremely hard to present within the 
bounds of the efficiency defense.  
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6 The broad picture – what will future cases look like?  
 
The previous chapters have provided for a fairly detailed analysis of two elements that are 
particularly relevant from a practical point of view.  Firstly, I identified the conditions that 
have always been considered satisfied when compulsory licenses have been invoked under 
art. 102, and ascertained how they are to be interpreted. 
265
 Secondly, I identified in what 
way the Commission’s modernized approach is different, and discussed the implications of 
applying this framework in future cases.
266
 
 
This last chapter is not intended to merely provide for a summary of these findings. Rather, 
it purports to take one step back and shed light on the broader issue of what the next refusal 
to license case might look like - when viewed through legalistic lenses. This entails ad-
dressing the questions of: 
 
 What categories of tests might be applied in future cases? 
 Which factors affect the likelihood for a finding of an abuse? 
 
In some respects, it is only possible to identify and distinguish between possibilities for 
future developments. In others, IP holders are actually provided with significant guidance.  
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6.1 What test might be applied in future cases? 
The analysis of the historical application of the “new product” condition revealed that the 
law on refusals to license originated from the proposition that the threshold for forced li-
censing of IP should be higher than the threshold for forced dealing of tangible property.
267
 
The Magill – style, formalistic “new product” condition played a key role in an IP -specific 
test which effectively amounted to a very low false convictions rule. 
268
  
 
It is not definitively ruled out that this traditional form of the “exceptional circumstances” 
test will be applied in future cases. The CFI’s judgment in Microsoft was not appealed, and 
the ECJ has consequently never had the chance to confirm or reject it.   
 
Nonetheless, it can hardly be emphasized too strongly that Microsoft amounts to the most 
recent and most comprehensive judgment on refusals to license. This paper has taken the 
position that it was less radical than is frequently argued, as the discussions under the non – 
IP specific conditions mostly reflected the specific facts of the case as opposed to a depar-
ture from established jurisprudence.  
 
That being said, a significant development did take place in conjunction with the identifica-
tion of the “new product” circumstance. 269 Conceptually, Microsoft represents a move 
from a formalistic application to an effect based approach. The basis for establishing that 
the “new product” condition was satisfied was not a comparison of specific products but an 
extensive inquiry into incentives for innovation on the competitor side. 
270
 In this respect, 
the CFI’s art. 102 (b) inquiry is dramatically different from a strict, Magill – style applica-
tion of the “new product” condition. While formally reflecting the cumulatively sufficient 
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“exceptional circumstances” list, Microsoft should consequently be regarded as an expres-
sion of the second test future refusals to license practices might be assessed against. 
 
The Microsoft doctrine represents a middle ground between the traditional test and the ap-
proach advocated by the Commission in its Guidance Paper. By limiting its examples to 
scenarios where the “new product” circumstance has been identified in case law, the Com-
mission plays down the implications of its generic refusal to supply test. The conclusion 
nevertheless remains that it has simply brushed out the very foundation for according IP 
“special deference” under a refusal to supply scenario.  
 
The Commission’s test should accordingly be regarded as an articulated example in the 
category of alternatives to the cumulatively sufficient “exceptional circumstances” list. 
Case law provides an opening for applying such a test, but it remains to be seen how the 
courts will fare with the Commission’s approach. 271  
  
6.2 Which factors affect the likelihood for a finding of an abuse? 
While the existence of three categories of possible tests represents a fundamental uncertain-
ty for IP holders, the relevant sources provide them with significant guidance about factors 
which practically affect the likelihood for a finding of an abuse. Case law furthermore fol-
lows a distinct pattern which might be interpreted as a reflection of unarticulated factors. In 
the following, I will identify the articulated factors and provide some thoughts on the ar-
guments IP holders may invoke if the pattern is broken in future proceedings.  
 
Firstly, case law reflects a distinction between refusals to facilitate market entry and offen-
sive leveraging of market power into a secondary market. Microsoft essentially confirmed 
Commercial Solvents in the refusal to license context, indicating that the factor of a disrup-
tion of historical levels of supplies of an indispensable input coupled with entry into the 
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secondary market increases the likelihood for a finding of an abuse. 
272
 In general, disrup-
tions of established levels of supplies are more likely to be considered abusive, and more 
difficult to justify on grounds of claimed efficiencies. 
273
  
 
The second factor is that of degree of dominance. It was Microsoft’s extraordinary position 
on the client PC OS market that made the ability to achieve sufficient interoperability with 
“Windows” an indispensable sales argument for work group server OS.274 Throughout its 
ruling, the CFI made repeated references to the company’s long lasting super – dominant 
position. 
275
 Subsequently, it has been observed that entities with market positions in the 
lower end of the dominance scale are unlikely to be caught in refusal to license cases.
276
 
 
TeliaSonera deserves mentioning at this point, as the ECJ was explicitly asked to provide 
guidance on the relevance of the factor of “degree of dominance” in the establishment of an 
abuse in this case. The Court stressed that, as a general rule, the degree of market strength 
is relevant “in relation to the extent of the effects of the conduct of the undertaking con-
cerned rather than in relation to the question of whether the abuse as such exists”. 277  
 
This clarification is consistent with the CFI’s approach in Microsoft as it did not consider 
Microsoft’s super dominant position as indicative of an abuse per se, but incorporated it in 
a highly fact specific analysis of the effects of the refusal. It does not alter the conclusion, 
however, that in practice, the degree of dominance in the primary market affects the likeli-
hood for a finding of an abuse as a very strong market position makes it all the more likely 
that the requisite effects will be observed. If the proprietor is already active in the second-
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ary market and has obtained a strong market position there, this will similarly affect the 
likelihood for a finding of an abuse. 
278
 
 
Thirdly, the CFI’s call for timely intervention when the secondary market is characterized 
by the presence of strong network effects is important. 
279
 It was made in relation to the 
“elimination of competition” requirement, which a number of commentators regard as be-
ing relaxed in Microsoft.
280
 One possible interpretation, therefore, is that the identification 
of strong network effects on a secondary market the IP holder seeks to monopolize by 
means of the refusal lowers the threshold for intervention by shifting the focus to a risk of a 
future monopolization as opposed to an actual or immediate elimination of competition.   
 
As regards unarticulated factors, a crucial observation is that the two most controversial 
refusal to license cases, namely IMS and Microsoft, could both be regarded as standardiza-
tion cases. 
281
 It has been observed that a Magill – style, formalistic “new product” condi-
tion might be too high a threshold for access to IPRs that effectively governs access to in-
dustry standards. 
282
 A general broadening of the “new product” condition on the other 
hand, would arguably reflect a failure of properly ascertaining the standardization issue in 
isolation. 
283
 On this basis, one might take the position that the relaxation of the “new” 
product criterion in IMS and especially in Microsoft, is specific to the standardization con-
text. Future defendants who do not control access to a de facto standard would be well ad-
vised to advocate this interpretation.  
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Lastly, the instances at which compulsory licensing has been invoked by the community 
courts share a common denominator in that they concerned “peripheral” and “weak” copy-
rights. 
284
 Forced licensing has never been invoked in relation to any other form of IP and 
never in relation to the core of the intended protection under the copyright regime in ques-
tion. 
285
 This pattern might reflect that the intrinsic qualities of the IP right is taken into 
account as a relevant factor when determining whether its concrete exercise is prohibited 
by Article 102.
286
 It has been argued that such a qualitative evaluation would be “systemat-
ically adequate to undertake”. 287Again, the existence of an identifiable pattern provides IP 
holders with arguments if it is broken in future proceedings.  
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